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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the impact of costless information linkage systems 
on the organization structure, transfer price and profit of companies. 
These firms typically consist of a headquarters (HQ) and downstream 
divisions (DD). Recent research on management accounting emphasizes 
the importance of a firm choosing the optimal level of internal transfer price 
and organization structure to maximize its total profit. The study constructs 
an analytical model to analyze the optimal decisions a firm that faces price 
competition in a product market needs to make. Our mathematical analysis 
demonstrates that a firm’s profit declines when it adopts an information 
linkage system that mitigates the information asymmetry between the HQ 
and DD in a competitive price environment. This is a novel result, since 
prior management accounting research indicates that information linkages 
between intra-organization divisions improve the firm’s total profit. The result 
of this study is attributed to the loss of incentive for tacit collusion between 
competitors. The firm has no incentive to decide on the decentralization of 
decision rights by adopting an information linkage system. Therefore, this 
research has a significant implication for management accounting practice. 
Firms should exercise caution when adopting an information linkage system, 
as – under specific economic conditions – it may not improve their profits.
Keywords: strategic transfer pricing, organization structure, information 
asymmetry, information linkage system, tax
THE IMPACT OF AN INFORMATION LINKAGE 
SYSTEM ON A FIRM’S ORGANIZATION 
STRUCTURE, TRANSFER PRICE AND PROFIT
Jumpei Hamamura
Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Kobe University, Japan
E-mail: junpei.hamamura@stu.kobe-u.ac.jp 
ARTICLE InFO
Article History: 
Received: 28 November 2017
Accepted: 24 January 2018
Published: 30 April 2018
132
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 13 Issue 1
INTRODUCTION
Recent events show the increased significance of transfer prices in 
operational decisions, particularly for large firms such as multinationals, 
which are composed of multiple divisions. For example, multinational 
enterprises (e.g., Starbucks Corporation) use transfer prices to avoid paying 
tax on profits. To curtail tax avoidance, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) established guidelines for multinational 
transfer pricing practices. In addition, General Motors Company (GM) 
and Panasonic use transfer prices to optimize their divisional operations 
and profits. Transfer prices allow managers to evaluate the manufacturing 
division’s performance as a cost or profit center. While the firm can 
evaluate divisional performance effectively and accurately using transfer 
pricing, it is difficult to determine the optimal level of transfer pricing for 
a firm composed of divisions. Hence, in practice, firms are interested in 
determining optimal transfer pricing under specific conditions. From this 
fact, transfer prices are undoubtedly an essential factor in contemporary 
management accounting practice. Selecting an optimal transfer price can 
improve a firm’s profit from a management accounting perspective, and is 
a popular topic in empirical management accounting research (e.g., Chan 
and Lo, 2004; Tang, 1992; Terzioglu and Inglis, 2011).
This study expands on the analysis of Narayanan and Smith (2000), a 
seminal work in the literature on strategic transfer pricing. narayanan and 
Smith investigated the optimal choice of transfer price and organization 
structure under asymmetric information and differential tax rates between 
inter-firm divisions. This paper demonstrates how the optimal transfer price 
and organization structure may be determined based on their results. 
In addition, following Baiman and Rajan (2002), this paper introduces 
an information linkage system into the model. In practice, information 
linkage systems (e.g., the point-of-sale (POS) data system used in Japanese 
convenience stores and the mileage system employed in the airline industry) 
provide information to the management division. While Baiman and Rajan 
(2002) examine the impact of the information linkage system between 
buyers and suppliers, this study analyzes its effect between the headquarters 
(HQ) and downstream division (DD) of a firm, both of which belong to the 
same organization.
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Narayanan and Smith (2000) show that competition and asymmetric 
information lead to a decentralized organizational structure, a transfer price 
above the marginal cost, asymmetric information, and a differential tax 
rate. Firms facing price competition aim to set a higher price by strategic 
complementarity. If firms choose decentralization, they can set a higher 
transfer price via tax avoidance and information asymmetry under specific 
conditions. In addition, information asymmetry leads firms to choose a 
decentralization strategy to use the DD’s private information. This study 
assumes that costless information linking systems mitigate the information 
asymmetry between the HQ and DD. Hence, in narayanan and Smith’s 
(2000) model, if the firm adopts an information linking system, it loses the 
incentive to choose a decentralized organizational structure. Therefore, 
in this case, the firm must be efficiently managed by the HQ, because the 
HQ has the decision rights and demand information. While it is believed 
that information linkage improves the effectiveness of a firm in practice, 
Baiman and Rajan (2002) construct an incomplete contract model and show 
that an information linkage system cannot improve the firm’s profit under 
specific conditions. This viewpoint indicates that there is some possibility of 
a decline in the firm’s profit if it uses an information linkage system under 
specific economic situations.
This research examines the firm’s choices of organization structure 
and level of transfer price, as well as the economic consequences of using 
an information linkage system. The economic analysis of transfer pricing 
with price competition from a managerial viewpoint dates back to Hirshleifer 
(1956), where the internal transfer price is set equal to the marginal cost to 
alleviate any attendant double-marginalization problem. Since the work of 
Hirshleifer (1956), others have analyzed the optimal level of the transfer 
price in management accounting using the market competition model (e.g., 
Alles and Datar, 1998; Arya and Mittendorf, 2007; Autrey and Bova, 2012; 
Fjell and Foros, 2008; Göx, 2000; Johnson, Löffler and Pfeiffer, 2016; 
Matsui, 2011, 2012, 2013; narayanan and Smith, 2000; Shor and Chen, 
2009). Most prior studies consider the optimal level of transfer pricing by 
comparing the marginal cost and discussing the cost-based transfer price 
(e.g., Alles and Datar, 1998; Matsui, 2011, 2013). This is because Tang 
(1992) provides important empirical evidence on transfer pricing practice 
and, specifically, the relationship between the transfer price and a cost 
accounting system. Because the model in this study pertains to strategic 
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transfers, it can be classified as belonging to the literature on strategic 
transfer pricing.
Narayanan and Smith (2000) and Göx (2000) consider the choice of 
organization structure in strategic transfer pricing. In practice, many firms 
choose a decentralized organization and aim to increase direct contact with 
customers. Notably, convenience stores’ DDs (retail stores) in Japan are 
centralized in terms of decision rights. Therefore, retail stores have no right 
to decide the market price. Göx and Shiller (2007) also suggest that strategic 
transfer pricing research should examine firms’ organization structure 
decisions. Another important assumption in strategic transfer pricing 
research relates to the existence of information asymmetry between divisions 
(e.g., Narayanan and Smith, 2000; Göx and Schöndube, 2004). In addition, 
Narayanan and Smith (2000) only assume simultaneous information 
asymmetry between divisions and the choice of organization structure 
under price competition. It is argued that a decentralized organization is 
caused by information asymmetry in management accounting. Hence, 
management accounting research requires a model that simultaneously 
includes information asymmetry and organization structure.1 
In contract theory, the existence of information asymmetry between 
the principal and agent lowers the principal’s payoff, in most cases, because 
of agency costs or information rent. Hence, prior studies investigate ways 
to mitigate this information asymmetry and secure efficient contracts (e.g., 
Baiman and Rajan, 2002). An information linkage system is one way to 
mitigate the information asymmetry between the principal and agent. 
This system helps the firm obtain the private information of agents (e.g., 
a customer relationship management (CRM) system in pharmacies, or a 
POS data system in convenience stores). In addition, some firms, such as 
nEC Corporation, provide information linkage systems between divisions. 
From the perspective of management accounting, open book accounting, as 
in the construction industry in the U.K., or target costing, as practiced by 
Toyota Motor Corporation, improves a firm’s profit and is recommended 
to achieve a high firm value. This study considers an information linkage 
system that mitigates the information asymmetry between the HQ and DD.
1 Studies on strategic transfer pricing that use the contract theory are an exception; they assume 
information asymmetry (e.g., Baldenius, 2000; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1991). 
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This research demonstrates that a counterintuitive result that an 
information linkage system lowers a firm’s profit under a specific economic 
condition. This is a novel result, not found previously in the literature on 
strategic transfer pricing under price competition environments. Information 
linkage systems are adopted under centralized structures. Hence, the firm has 
no incentive to choose a higher market price, because the level of the transfer 
price is equal to the market price or marginal cost. Therefore, under price 
competition, a firm cannot set a higher price by tacit collusion, as shown by 
Narayanan and Smith (2000). As a result, adopting a costless information 
linkage system in transfer pricing causes the firm’s profit to decline. 
This result suggests significant implications for management 
accounting practice. The result in this paper demonstrates that adopting an 
information linkage system lowers a firm’s profit, while previous studies 
on management accounting argue the opposite result, namely that adopting 
such a system improves a firm’s profit. When a firm adopts an information 
linkage system, the DD cannot decide the market price. Hence, it uses the 
transfer price, leading to large tax avoidance, which distorts the optimal 
resource allocation and causes tacit collusion. From the perspective of 
strategic transfer pricing research, the result in this study suggests that 
adopting an information linkage system creates these negative effects. 
Therefore, a firm must be cautious when adopting such systems in price 
competitive environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the setting of the model in this paper. Section 3 constructs the model and 
presents results in this study. Lastly, section 4 concludes the paper.
MODEL
In this section, an analytical model which describes transfer pricing in 
divisionalized firms is proposed. This study assumes two firms, Firms 1 
and 2, that engage in differentiated price competition in the market. There 
are two divisions in each firm: HQ and DD. The HQs produce intermediate 
goods with a marginal cost c, which the DDs sell in the final goods market 
at price p. The DD adds value to the intermediate goods before selling them 
in the final goods market. However, both this value and the cost of adding 
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value are normalized to 0. Table 1 provides the necessary notations. In 
addition, Figure 1 illustrates the situation analyzed in this study.
Firm i faces the following demand function:
qi = a – pi + θpj (1)
where  denotes the demand of firm i (=1, 2); a is a positive constant, 
greater than the cost parameter c(a>c); and pi and pj are the market price of 
firm i and firm j, respectively, where j is a competitor to i. Hereafter, (i, j) 
are represented as either (1,2) or (2,1). The degree of substitution between 
production is denoted as θ ∈ (0, 1). When θ approaches 0, firm i engages 
in a monopoly. Then, a is a random valuable with density function fa(a), 
distribution function Fa(a), mean μa, variance σ
2
a, and support [a, ā] .
Table 1: Notations
    Profit for the downstream market division in a firm
    Joint profit for a firm 
i Subscript that indexes the firm 
j Subscript that indexes the firm that is different from firm i
h Subscript that indexes the firm’s HQ
d Subscript that indexes the firm’s DD
p Market price
q Quantity
c Direct manufacturing cost per unit
μ Average of random variable
σ2 Variance of random variable
T Transfer price
t Tax rate
τ Profit rate after tax
a Positive constant greater than c
0 Organization structure (0i ∈{C, D}.  is centralization and D is decentralization)
θ Substitutability of products supplied by the two firms (0<θ<1) (1-θ is the degree 
of product differentiation)
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he HQ’s manufacturing cost is  per unit of product produced, where 
is a random variable with density function fc(c), distribution function Fc(c), 
meam μc, variance σc
2 and support [c, c]. This model assumes a – c > 0. That 
is, demand continues t  be positive (a) for the lowest possible realization 
of the demand function intercept, and (b) at a price equal to the highest 
possible realization of the marginal cost. This research assumes that the 
DD knows the manufacturing cost parameter c.
The profit function of firm i’s (= 1, 2) DD (πi
DD) is as follows:
πi
DD = (pi – Ti)qi, (2)
where Ti (≥ c) denotes the transfer price. The performance of the DD 
is evaluated in terms of this profit. Next, the joint profit function of firm i 
is as follows: 
Πi = πi
DD + (Ti – c)qi
 = (pi – c)qi (3)
Following Narayanan and Smith (2000), the HQ and DD in this study 
face different tax jurisdictions. The DD’s profits are taxed at rate td, while 
those in the HQ’s jurisdiction are taxed at rate th. Let tmin = min{td, th}. Let 
τk = 1 – tk, k ∈{h. d, min}. Then:
πi
DD = τd(pi – Ti)qi,  (4)
Πi   = τd(pi – Ti)qi + τh(Ti – c)qi,  (5)
Each decision-maker attempts to maximize this profit function.
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This model considers two organizational structures: 0i ∈{D, C}. In 
the first, the firm centralizes the pricing decision (strategy D). That is, 
the HQ sets the market price p. In the second, the firms decentralize the 
organizational structure by making the DD a profit center and delegating 
the pricing decision to it (strategy C). The HQ sets the transfer price T per 
unit of product purchased by the DD. The transfer price is used to compute 
the sales office’s profit. This study assumes that the firms undertake an 
explicit contract with the DD, which specifies the transfer price and the 
performance measure of the DD. When the HQ choose strategy D, the DD 
decides the market price p after observing a and T in order to maximize its 
profits. When the HQ choose strategy C, the HQ decides the market price 
p after observing the marginal manufacturing cost c, but without observing 
a, in order to maximize the firm’s total profit. Under both strategies, the 
HQ chooses the transfer price T after observing the marginal manufacturing 
cost c, but without observing a, in order to maximize the firm’s total profit. 
In addition, when strategy C is chosen, the transfer price is T = c or T = p. 
This assumption is the same as that of Narayanan and Smith (2000). The 
DD observes the realization of a, but the HQ knows only its distribution.
In addition, this study considers an information linkage system, such 
as the CRM system in pharmacies2. When information is shared between the 
HQ and DD, a signal informs the HQ about the demand information, which 
is private to the DD. Hence, when the firm adopts an information linkage 
system and chooses centralized strategy C, the HQ can decide the market 
price after observing a. This is the only difference between the approach 
in this paper and that of Narayanan and Smith (2000). For simplification, 
it is assumed that the HQ can obtain full information when the firm uses 
an information linkage system. In addition, this research assumes that the 
information linkage system is adopted exogenously. 
Lastly, the following timeline of events are proposed. The use of the 
information linkage system is denoted as IL, and the lack of it, as nIL. The 
timeline of events without information linkages (NIL) is depicted in Figure 2. 
2 For simplicity, there is no cost to obtain the DD’s private information in this research.
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Figure 2: Timeline of Events Without the Information Linkage System
In the first step, the HQ decides on the organization structure. Second, 
the manufacturing cost parameter c is realized and observed by the HQ and 
the DD. T ird, th  HQ decides the tr nsfer price T. next, a is realized and 
observed by the DD. Lastly, the HQ or DD decide on the market price p. 
Without the information linkage, the timeline of events is the same as that 
in Narayanan and Smith (2000). Figure 3 shows the timeline of events with 
the information linkage (IL).
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Figure 3: Timeline of Events with the Information Linkage System
If information is shared between divisions, it is added to the step 
of signal observation (observation of a) by the HQ. In addition, this 
model assumes that he fi  d es t pay the cost to obtain DD’s private 
information (and adopt information linkage system). Hence, HQ can obtain 
information by using an information linkage system.
MODEL ANALYSIS
Here, the constructed model i  th  prior sectio  is analyzed. First, the 
quilibrium when the competitor’s transfer pric  and organization are not 
observable is derived in this section. Narayanan and Smith (2000) also 
an lyze this situation. not that as per management accounting practice, it 
is valid to examine an unobservable situation. In the basic model setting, 
this study assumes that each decision-maker has to decide strategies 
without observi g all competitors’ strateg es. In addition, decision-makers 
can observe only their own firms’ strategies before deciding on the pricing 
strategy. This is reasonable, given the especially unique outcome narayanan 
and Smith (2000) obtain in the unobservable situation.
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First, the analysis characterizes the equilibrium without the 
information linkage system. The equilibrium is identified by considering, 
for each firm, the deviation from any organization structure, transfer price, 
and price. Given each firm’s decentralized strategy , the optimal strategies 
are considered the decision of the DD. Strategy  is chosen by firms in an 
equilibrium when
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system. The equilibrium is identified by consi ering, for each firm, the deviation from any 
organization structure, transfer price, and price. Given each firm’s decentralized strategy �,
the optimal strategies are considered the decision of the DD. Strategy � is chosen by firms in 
an equilibrium when 
�� �
�2 � ������2�� � ������ � ������� � �� � ������ � �� � �������
����� � ����� � 2�� � �����
� � ���,    ���
holds. Then, firm �’s HQ and DD choose their strategies, as follows:  
�� � �� � � �
2��� � ������ � �� � ����
�� � ����� � 2�� � ����
,                                                                       ��� 
�� � �� �
��� � ����� � 2�� � ������ � 2��� � ����� � �2 � �����
�2 � ����� � ����� � 2�� � �����
,     ���     ���
Π� � Π� �
����2�� � ������� � �� � ������ � �� � �������
��� � ����� � 2�� � �����
� �
�����
�2 � ��� �                ���
This result is a reproduction of narayan and Smith’s (2000) Propositions 5 and 6 
(Narayanan and Smith, 2000, 511–512). In this case, when �� � ��, the transfer price ��
exceeds the marginal cost. Equations (7)–(9) denote the optimal strategies and profit when 
the decentralization strategy is adopted. Hereafter, this research focuses on the case in which 
�� � �� holds, which is the unique outcome in Narayanan and Smith (2000). This study calls 
this case the decentralization equilibrium. notably, the decentralization equilibrium is unique 
in (6). Hence, this paper denotes the strategy without information linkage as ������, ������
and, when ��� � ��� holds, firms choose equilibrium strategies ������, ������ � ��, ��.
This result indicates that different tax rates between divisions cause the transfer price 
to exceed the marginal cost. The firm can choose a transfer price that exceeds the marginal 
cost only when it has a decentralized structure. Narayanan and Smith (2000, 511) show that 
decentralization is caused by asymmetric information. Hence, assuming asymmetric 
information, the transfer price exceeds the marginal cost owing to the effect of the differential 
tax rates. 
First, the logic of the decentralization equilibrium under information asymmetry is 
explained to understand the property of this equilibrium. In this case, information (i.e., the 
amount of information) assumes great significance in the decision of the HQ. If the 
information is important (the variance of the demand information ��� is large), the HQ wants 
to use the demand information effectively. Hence, the HQ chooses decentralization to utilize 
the DD’s private information and to decide on the market price efficiently. Past studies on 
strategic transfer pricing show that the HQ would ordinarily choose centralization when 
competitors’ strategies are unobservable, because centralization can mitigate the selfish 
behavior of the DD’s manager and steal the competitor from a high price.  
Second, it explains why the level of the transfer price increases with differential tax 
rates (i.e., a higher tax under the jurisdiction of the DD). When the after-tax profit of the DD 
 (6)
holds. Then, firm ’s HQ and DD choose their strategies, as follows: 
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�2 �� � ��� 2 � �����
,     ���     ���
Π� � Π� �
����2�� � ������� � �� � ������ � �� � �������
��� � ����� � 2�� � �����
� �
�����
�2 � ��� �                ���
This result is a r producti n of narayan and Smith’s (2000) Pr position  5 and 6 
(Narayanan and Smith, 2000, 511–512). In this case, whe  �� � ��, the transfer price ��
exceed  the marginal cost. Equat ons (7)–(9) denote the optimal strategies and profit when 
the decentraliza ion strategy is adopted. Her after, is research focuses on the case in which 
�� � �� holds, whic  is the unique utcome in Narayanan and Smith (2000). This study calls 
this case the decentralization equilibrium. notably, the decentralization equilibrium is unique 
in (6). Hence, this paper denotes the strategy without information linkage as ������, ������
and, when ��� � ��� holds, firms choose equilibrium strategies ������, ������ � ��, ��.
This result indicates that different tax rates between divisions cau e the tran fer price 
to exceed the ma ginal cost. The firm can choose a transfer price t at ex eeds the margi al 
cost only when it has a decentralized structure. Narayanan and Smith (2000, 511) show that 
decentralization is caused by asymmetric information. Hence, assuming asymmetric 
information, the transfer price exceeds the marginal cost owing to the effect of the differential 
tax rates. 
First, the logic of t  dece tralization quilibrium under information asymmetry is 
explained to understand the property of this equilibrium. In this case, i formation (i.e., the 
amount of information) assumes great significance in the decision of the HQ. If the 
information is important (the variance of the demand information ��� is large), the HQ wants 
to use the demand information effectively. Hence, the HQ chooses decentralization to utilize 
the DD’s private information and to decide on the market price efficiently. Past studies on 
strategic transfer pricing show that the HQ would ordinarily choose centralization when 
competitors’ strategies are unobservable, because centralization can mitigate the selfish 
behavior of the DD’s m ager and steal the competitor from a high pric . 
Second, it explains why the level of the transfer price increases with differential tax 
rates (i.e., a higher tax under the jurisdiction of the DD). When the after-tax profit of the DD 
This result is a reproduction of Narayan and Smith’s (2000) 
Propositi n  5 and 6 (Narayanan and Smith, 2000, 511–512). In this case, 
wh n τh > τd, the transfer price Ti exceeds he marginal cost. Equations 
(7)–(9) denote the optimal strategies and profit when the decentralization 
strategy is adopted. Hereafter, this research focuses on the case in which 
τh > τd holds, which is the unique outcome in Narayanan and Smith (2000). 
This study calls this case the decentralization equilibrium. notably, the 
decentralization equilibrium is unique in (6). Hence, this paper denot s 
the strategy without information linkage as (01
NIL, 02
NIL) and when σa ≤ σa2 
holds, firms choose equilibrium strategies (01
NIL, 02
NIL) = (D, D). 
This result indicates that different tax rates between divisions cause 
the transfer price to xceed the marginal cost. The firm can choose a transfer 
price that exceeds the marginal cost only when it has a decentralized 
structure. Narayanan and Smith (2000, 511) show that decentralization 
is caused by asymmetric information. Hence, assuming asymmetric 
information, the transfer price exceeds the marginal cost owing to the effect 
of the differential tax r tes.
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First, the logic of the decentralization equilibrium under information 
asymmetry is explained to understand the property of this equilibrium. 
In this case, information (i.e., the amount of information) assumes great 
significance in the decision of the HQ. If the information is important (the 
variance of the demand information σa
2 is large), the HQ wants to use the 
demand information effectively. Hence, the HQ chooses decentralization 
to utilize the DD’s private information and to decide on the market price 
efficiently. Past studies on strategic transfer pricing show that the HQ 
would ordinarily choose centralization when competitors’ strategies are 
unobservable, because centralization can mitigate the selfish behavior of 
the DD’s manager and steal the competitor from a high price. 
Second, it explains why the level of the transfer price increases with 
differential tax rates (i.e., a higher tax under the jurisdiction of the DD). 
When the after-tax profit of the DD is lower than that of the HQ, the firm 
has an incentive to transfer profits to the HQ from the DD. As a result, the 
HQ sets a higher transfer price, which exceeds the marginal cost, in order 
to transfer the profit between divisions. Then, the higher transfer price can 
improve the firm’s total profit by affecting the market price, because the 
DD’s cost is higher than the transfer price, which is equal to the marginal 
cost. In spite of the inability to observe a competitor’s transfer price, the 
level of the transfer price exceeds the marginal cost. narayanan and Smith 
(2000) argue that this results in tacit collusion. 
next, the analysis shows the firm’s decision when it adopts an 
information linkage system. The deviation incentive from a centralized 
strategy to a centralized competitor is considered to analyze the equilibrium. 
Accordingly, the analysis compares the equilibrium outcomes for firms with 
and without an information linkage system. The analysis first examines 
the equilibrium outcome of firm i with an information linkage system. All 
proofs appear in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. For a firm with an information linkage system, (01NIL, 
02
NIL) = (C, C) is chosen in equilibrium. Then, τh > τd, and firm i chooses 
the market price strategy
In addition, (01
NIL, 02
NIL) = (D, D) is also chosen in equilibrium when 
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is lower than that of the HQ, the firm has an incentive to transfer profits to the HQ from the 
DD. As a result, the HQ sets a higher transfer price, which exceeds the marginal cost, in order 
to transfer the profit between divisions. Then, the higher transfer price can improve the firm’s 
total profit by affecting the market price, because the DD’s cost is higher than the transfer 
price, which is equal to the marginal cost. In spite of the inability to observe a competitor’s 
transfer price, the level of the transfer price exceeds the marginal cost. narayanan and Smith 
(2000) argue that this results in tacit collusion.  
next, the analysis shows the firm’s decision when it adopts an information linkage 
system. The deviation incentive from a centralized strategy to a centralized competitor is 
considered to analyze the equilibrium. Accordingly, the analysis compares the equilibrium 
outcomes for firms with and without an information linkage system. The analysis first 
examines the equilibrium outcome of firm � with an information linkage system. All proofs 
appear in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1. For a firm with an information linkage system, ������ ����� � ��� �� is 
chosen in equilibrium. Then, �� � ��, and firm � chooses the market price strategy 
�� � �� �
� � �
� � � . 
In addition, ������ ����� � ��� �� is also chosen in equilibrium when  
��� �
1
4��� � �����4 � ����� � ��1 � �����
� ��� � ��
��� ����
� ����4���� � ������ � �� � �������
� ��� � �� � ����� � �� � �����������
� ��� � 1�� � ������ � ��� � �� � �������� � �� � ����������
holds. 
From Proposition 1, it notes that the information linkage system increases the firm’s 
incentive for centralization at its HQ. Except for specific conditions, the HQ does not choose 
the centralization strategy without an information linkage system. However, when such a 
system is adopted, it clearly notices its effect, because each firm chooses the centralization 
strategy. In addition, from Proposition 1, it finds that there exist multiple equilibria. However, 
this study does not pay attention to the decentralized equilibrium because this outcome does 
not differ from that in the absence of an information linkage system.  
From the centralized equilibrium outcome of Proposition 1, the following proposition 
is obtained by comparing the equilibrium profits.  
Proposition 2. With an information linkage system and a centralized outcome, when 
holds.
From Proposition 1, it notes that the inf rmation linkage system 
inc eases the firm’s incentive for centr lization t it  HQ. Except for specific 
conditions, the HQ does not choose the centralization strategy without an 
information linkage system. However, when such a system is adopted, 
it clearly notices its effect, because each firm chooses the centralization 
strategy. In addition, from Proposition 1, it finds that there exist multiple 
equilibria. However, this study does not pay attention to the decentralized 
equilibrium because this outcome does not differ from that in the absence 
of an information linkage system. 
From the central zed equilibrium outcome of Proposition 1, the 
following proposition is obtained by comparing the equilibrium profits. 
Proposition 2. With an information linkage system and a centralized 
outcome, when
0 < θ < 1, τh > τd, and 
54 – 146θ + 772θ2 + 16θ3 – 10θ4 < 0,
σa ≤ σa2 ≤ σa
where
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� � � � �, �� � ��, and  
�� � ���� � ���� � ���� � ���� � �,
��� � ��� � ���,
where
��� �
�� � ��������� � ������ � ������� � �� � ������ � �� � �������
����� � ����� � ��� � �����
�  ,
��� �
���� � �� � ������ � �� � ��������� ��� � ���� � ������ � ��� � ������
��� � ����� � ��� � �����
�
holds. The firm’s equilibrium profit declines from the profit realized in a decentralized 
equilibrium without information linkages.  
This result is unique and essential when considering the effect of information linkage 
systems. Studies on management accounting namely open book accounting or target costing, 
argue that information linkage systems improve a firm’s profit. Quick information linkages 
are crucial in management accounting practice, as in a POS data system in a convenience 
store. However, from �� � ���� � ���� � ���� � ���� � �, this study shows that 
information linkages lower  a  firm’s profit under a specific condition, namely when the 
degree of product differentiation is low. Hence, the firm engages in intense competition. In 
the decentralization equilibrium, the market price increases by transfer pricing and, therefore, 
the decline in profit is lower than that in the centralization equilibrium. 
The economic intuition of this result is as follows. Information linkage systems allow 
the HQ to obtain information from the DD3. When the HQ can obtain this information, its 
incentive to centralize increases. When the HQ chooses the centralization strategy, the 
transfer price is not an internal solution. Then, the firm cannot increase the market price. As a 
result, the market price in the centralized equilibrium is lower than that inthe decentralized 
equilibrium. Hence, each firm’s profit declines in a centralized equilibrium. 
The condition of holding Proposition 2 is affected by the importance of the private 
information of the DD (i.e., the variance of the demand information, ���). If the variance of 
the demand information, ���, is extremely small, the firm loses the incentive to decentralize 
without the information linkage system. Thus, in this case, firms have no incentive to choose 
the tacit collusion strategy. In addition, when the variance of the demand information, ���, is 
extremely large, the efficiency of the information linkage system is improved, and the benefit 
without the system cannot exceed the benefit with the system. Therefore, when the variance 
of the demand information is of a reasonable degree, the result in Proposition 2 is obtained. 
However, the difference in the tax rates between divisions is an important factor to 
derive the main result in this study. When �� � �� does not hold, the firm cannot improve the 
firm-wide profit by choosing tacit collusion prices without the information system. Therefore, 
                                                            
3 There is no cost to obtain the DD’s private information. 
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 holds. The firm’s equilibrium profit declines from the profit realized 
in a decentralized equilibrium without information linkages. 
This result is unique and essential when considering the effect of 
information linkage systems. Studies on management accounting namely 
open book accounting or target costing, argue that information linkage 
systems improve a firm’s profit. Quick information linkages are crucial in 
management accounting practice, as in a POS data system in a convenience 
store. However, from 54 – 146θ + 772θ2 + 16θ3 – 10θ4 < 0, this study shows 
that information linkages lower  a  firm’s profit under a specific condition, 
namely when the degree of product differentiation is low. Hence, the firm 
engages in intense competition. In the decentralization equilibrium, the 
market price increases by transfer pricing and, therefore, the decline in 
profit is lower than that in the centralization equilibrium.
The economic intuition of this result is as follows. Information 
linkage systems allow the HQ to obtain information from the DD3. When 
the HQ can obtain this information, its incentive to centralize increases. 
When the HQ chooses the centralization strategy, the transfer price is not 
an internal solution. Then, the firm cannot increase the market price. As 
a result, the market price in the centralized equilibrium is lower than that 
in the decentralized equilibrium. Hence, each firm’s profit declines in a 
centralized equilibrium.
The condition of holding Proposition 2 is affected by the importance 
of the private information of the DD (i.e., the variance of the demand 
information, σa
2). If the variance of the demand information, σa
2, is extremely 
small, the firm loses the incentive to decentralize without the information 
linkage system. Thus, in this case, firms have no incentive to choose the tacit 
collusion strategy. In addition, when the variance of the demand information, 
σa
2, is extremely large, the efficiency of the information linkage system is 
improved, and the benefit without the system cannot exceed the benefit with 
the system. Therefore, when the variance of the demand information is of 
a reasonable degree, the result in Proposition 2 is obtained.
However, the difference in the tax rates between divisions is an 
important factor to derive the main result in this study. When τh > τd does not 
3 There is no cost to obtain the DD’s private information.
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hold, the firm cannot improve the firm-wide profit by choosing tacit collusion 
prices without the information system. Therefore, the profit without the 
information linkage system is lower, and the result in Proposition 2 cannot 
be obtained in this model.
In addition, it considers the threshold σa, which is difference in profit 
between the decentralized equilibrium without the information linkage 
system and the centralized equilibrium with the information linkage system. 
Then, following propositions are obtained: 
Proposition 3 Threshold σa, which is the difference in profit between 
(01
NIL, 02
NIL) = (C, C) and (01
NIL, 02
NIL) = (D, D), increases with an increase 
in τh when
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the profit without the information linkage system is lower, and the result in Proposition 2 
cannot be obtained in this model. 
In addition, it considers the threshold ���, which is difference in profit between the 
decentraliz d equilibrium without the information linkage system and the centralized 
equilibrium with the information linkage system. Then, following propositions are obtained:  
Proposition 3 Threshold ���, which is the difference in profit between ������ ����� �
��� �� and ������� ������ � �����, increases with an increase in �� when 
�� �
2�� � ���
� � �� � ��� ��
holds. 
Proposition 4 Threshold ���, which is the difference in profit between ������ ����� �
��� �� and ������� ������ � �����, decreases with an increase of �� when 
�� �
� � �� � ���
2�� � ��� ��
holds. 
Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that the difference in profit between ������ ����� � ��� ��
and ������� ������ � ��� �� is affected by the change in the after-tax rate. From Propositions 3 
and 4, it notes that the effect of an increase in the after-tax rate of the HQ and a decrease in 
the after-tax rate of the DD has the same impact on the threshold ���. In addition, because 
firms transfer the profit between divisions using transfer prices, increasing the transfer price, 
which is affected by changes in the tax rate, affects the market price. Thus, the effect of 
improving the profit by changing the market price is different between the decentralized and 
the centralized equilibrium. narayanan and Smith (2000) show that increasing the tax rate of 
the DD, �� (decreasing the after-tax rate of the DD, ��) improves a firm’s profit because of 
the increase in the transfer price and the market price when �� � �� holds. Hence, the value 
of the threshold ���, which is the difference when the centralized equilibrium profit is 
subtracted from the decentralized equilibrium profit, is increased when the decentralized 
equilibrium profit tends to improve. In this analysis, the profit in the decentralized 
equilibrium is improved by decreasing �� (increasing ��). Hence, Propositions 3 and 4 is 
obtained. 
CONCLUSION 
This study, investigated the economic impact on firms of information linkage systems, which 
mitigate the information asymmetry between firms’ divisions. These results show that an 
information linkage system lowers a firm’s profit under specific conditions, owing to a 
decrease in the market price. With an information linkage system, the firm’s HQ has a strong 
incentive to centralize, because the HQ can obtain the DD’s private information. Hence, the 
holds.
Proposition 4 Threshold σa, which is the difference in profit between 
(01
NIL, 02
NIL) = (C, C) and (01
NIL, 02
NIL) = (D, D), decreases with an increase 
of τd when
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the profit without the information linkage system is lower, and the result in Proposition 2 
cannot be obtained in this model. 
In addition, it considers the threshold ���, which is difference in profit between the 
decentralized equilibrium without the information linkage system and the centralized 
equilibrium with the information linkage system. Then, following propositions are obtained:  
Proposition 3 Threshold ���, which is the difference in profit between ������ ����� �
��� �� and ������� ������ � � �, increases with an increase in �� when 
�� �
2�� � ���
� � �� � ��� ��
holds. 
Proposition 4 Threshold ���, which is the difference in profit between ������ ����� �
��� �� and ������� ������ � � � �, decreases with an increase of �� when 
�� �
� � �� � ���
2�� � ��� ��
holds. 
Pr positions 3 and 4 indicate that the diff rence in profit betw en ������ ����� � ��� ��
and ������� ������ � ��� �� is affect d by the ch nge in the aft r-tax rate. From Propositions 3 
and 4, it notes that the effect of an increase i  the after-tax rate of the HQ and a decrease in 
t e after-tax rate of the DD has t  s me imp ct on the threshold ���. In addition, because 
firms transfer the profit between divisions using transfer p ices, increasing th  transfer price, 
which is affected by changes in the tax rate, affects the market price. Thus, the effect of 
improving the profit by changing the market price is different between the decentralized and 
the centralized equilibrium. narayanan and Smith (2000) show that increasing the tax rate of 
the DD, �� (decreasing the after-tax rate of the DD, ��) improves a firm’s profit because of 
the increase in the transfer price and the market price when �� � �� holds. Hence, the value 
of the threshold ���, which is the difference when the centralized equilibrium profit is 
subtracted from the decentralized equilibrium profit, is increased when the decentralized 
equilibrium profit tends to improve. In this analysis, the profit in the decentralized 
equilibrium is improved by decreasing �� (increasing ��). Hence, Propositions 3 and 4 is 
obtained. 
CONCLUSION 
This study, investigated the economic impact on firms of information linkage systems, which 
mitigate the information asymmetry between firms’ divisions. These results show that an 
information linkage system lowers a firm’s profit under specific conditions, owing to a 
decrease in the market price. With an information linkage system, the firm’s HQ has a strong 
incentive to centralize, because the HQ can obtain the DD’s private information. Hence, the 
holds.
Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that the difference in profit between 
(01
NIL, 02
NIL) = (C, C) and (01
NIL, 02
NIL) = (D, D) is affected by the change in 
the after-tax rate. From Propositions 3 and 4, it notes that the effect of an 
increase in the after-tax rate of the HQ and a decrease in the after-tax rate 
of the DD has the same impact on the threshold σa. In addition, because 
firms trans er the profit between divisions using transf r prices, incr asing 
the transfer pric , which is ff cted by changes i  the t x rat , affects the 
market price. Thus, the effect o  improving the profit by changing the market 
price is diff rent between the decentralized and the entralized quilibrium. 
Narayanan and Smith (2000) show that increasing the tax rate of the DD, 
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td  (decreasing the after-tax rate of the DD, τh) improves a firm’s profit 
because of the increase in the transfer price and the market price when 
τh > τd holds. Hence, the value of the threshold σa, which is the difference 
when the centralized equilibrium profit is subtracted from the decentralized 
equilibrium profit, is increased when the decentralized equilibrium profit 
tends to improve. In this analysis, the profit in the decentralized equilibrium 
is improved by decreasing τd (increasing τh). Hence, Propositions 3 and 4 
is obtained.
CONCLUSION
This study, investigated the economic impact on firms of information 
linkage systems, which mitigate the information asymmetry between 
firms’ divisions. These results show that an information linkage system 
lowers a firm’s profit under specific conditions, owing to a decrease in the 
market price. With an information linkage system, the firm’s HQ has a 
strong incentive to centralize, because the HQ can obtain the DD’s private 
information. Hence, the level of the transfer price is not decided as an internal 
solution, and the market price is not increased. As a result, firms cannot 
improve their profit because they cannot choose a higher price.
This study makes an important contribution to strategic transfer pricing 
research. Following Narayanan and Smith (2000), this study shows the 
importance of information asymmetry in strategic transfer pricing. This 
research proves that adopting an information linkage system can lead to 
a decline in a firm’s profit under a specific economic condition. This is a 
significant result because in management accounting practice, information 
linkages typically improve firms’ profits. Thus, this study posits that firms 
should be cautious when adopting information linkage systems. 
This study has several limitations. First, it considers the problem using 
specific economic assumptions, such as a certain number of firms and the 
shape of the demand function. In addition, the analysis assumes that adopting 
an information linking system supplies accurate demand information to the 
HQ. It is difficult to assume that these settings are similar to management 
accounting practice; however, these settings help simplify the analysis and 
explain the logic. The second limitation is that the decision to adopt an 
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information linking system is exogenous. However, this study focuses on 
the current status of information linking in practice, and shows that adopting 
such a system does not improve the firm’s profit in specific conditions. 
Therefore, the study can consider the endogenous decision to adopt an 
information linking system in future research, though it is also important 
for management accounting research to consider current practices (e.g., 
Japanese convenience stores) and alert firms of the problem. Consequently, 
this study questions the adoption of information linking systems in many 
firms, for example, POS data systems, which is a significant implication 
in management accounting practice. While firms can obtain information, 
acquiring information sometimes does not improve the firm’s profit. Notably, 
this study shows that tax avoidance through transfer pricing lowers a firm’s 
profit. Hence, findings suggest that firms must consider the impact of 
information linking systems on transfer pricing levels. 
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
First, this proof shows Proposition 1. When τh > τd holds and each 
firm chooses the centralization strategy, each firm also selects the level of 
transfer price Ti such that Ti = pi. In addition, each firm chooses the market 
price as follows:
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First, this proof shows Proposition 1. When �� � �� holds and each firm chooses the 
centralization strategy, each firm also selects the level of transfer price �� such that �� � ��. In 
addition, each firm chooses the market price as follows: 
�� � �� �
� � �
2 � � .                                                                                                                ����
The firms’ total profit is as follows:  
Π� � Π� �
������ � �� � ������ � ��� � �� � �������
�2 � ���   . ��2�
Firm �’s incentive to deviate from this realized profit is considered in the following analysis. 
Given the competitor’s strategy (A1), the decision makers in firm � face the following 
object function:  
���� � ����� � ��� �� � �� � �
� � �
2 � ���                               ����
Π� � � ������ � ��� � ����� � ��� �� � �� � �
� � �
2 � ��
��
�
������ .            ����
Under decentralization, the DD decides the market price �� to maximize (A3). The HQ 
choose the internal transfer price �� to maximize (A4). As a result, when firm � deviates to 
decentralization, its DD chooses the deviation market price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2� � �� � �2 � ����
2�2 � ��  .                                     ����
In addition, HQ choose the deviation internal transfer price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2����� � �� � ���2�� � ���
�2 � ���2�� � ���
  . ����
Using (A5) and (A6), the deviation profitΠ���� is obtained as follows: 
Π���� �
������ � �� � ������ � ���2�� � ������ � �� � ���������
�2 � ����2�� � ���
 .         ����
The difference between (A2) and (A7) is obtained (it subtracts Π�from Π����). 
  (A1)
The firms’ total profit is as follows: 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
First, this proof shows Proposition 1. When �� � �� holds and each firm chooses the 
centralization strategy, each firm also selects the level of transfer price �� such that �� � ��. In 
addition, each firm chooses the market price as follows: 
�� � �� �
� � �
2 � � .                                                                                                                ����
The firms’ total profit is as follows:  
Π� � Π� �
������ � �� � ������ � �� � �� � �������
�2 � ���   . ��2�
Firm �’s incentive to deviate from this realized profit is considered in the following analysis. 
Given the competitor’s strategy (A1), the decision makers in firm � face the following 
object function:  
���� � ����� � ��� �� � �� � �
� � �
2 � ���                               ����
Π� � � ������ � ��� � ����� � ��� �� � �� � �
� � �
2 � ��
��
�
������ .            ����
Under decentralization, the DD decides the market price �� to maximize (A3). The HQ 
choose the internal transfer price �� to maximize (A4). As a result, when firm � deviates to 
decentralization, its DD chooses the deviation market price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2� � �� � �2 � ����
2�2 � ��  .                                     ����
In addition, HQ choose the deviation internal transfer price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2����� � �� � ���2�� � ���
�2 � ���2�� � ���
  . ����
Using (A5) and (A6), the deviation profitΠ���� is obtained as follows: 
Π���� �
������ � �� � ������ � ���2�� � ������ � �� � ���������
�2 � ����2�� � ���
 .         ����
The difference between (A2) and (A7) is obtained (it subtracts Π�from Π����). 
 (A2)
Firm i’s incentive to deviate from this realized profit is considered in 
the following analysis.
Given the competitor’s strategy (A1), the decision makers in firm i 
face the following object function: 
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P oof of Prop sition 1 
Firs , this proof shows Proposition 1. When �� � �� holds and each firm chooses the 
centralization strategy, each firm also selects the level of transfer price �� such that ��. In 
addition, each firm chooses the market price as follows: 
�� � �� �
� � �
2  .                                                                                                                ����
The firms’ total profit is as follows:  
Π� � Π� �
������ � �� � ������ � ��� � �� � �������
�2 � ���   . ��2�
Firm �’s incentive to deviate from this realized profit is considered in the following analysis. 
Given the competitor’s strategy (A1), the decision makers in firm � face the following 
object function:  
��� � ��� � � ��� � � � � �
� � �
2 ��                               ����
Π� � � ������ � ��� � ����� � ��� �� � �� � �
� � �
2 � ��
��
�
������ .            ����
Under decentralization, the DD decides the market price �� to maximize (A3). The HQ 
choose the internal transfer price �� to maximize (A4). As a result, when firm � deviates to 
decentralization, its DD chooses the deviation market price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2� � �� � �2 � ����
2�2 �  .                                     ����
In addition, HQ choose the deviation internal transfer price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2����� � �� � ���2�� � ���
�2 � ���2� � � �  . ����
Using (A5) and (A6), the deviation profitΠ���� is obtained as follows: 
Π���� �
������ � �� � ������ � ���2�� � ������ � �� � ���������
�2 � ����2�� � ���
 .         ����
The difference between (A2) and (A7) is obtained (it subtracts Π�from Π����). 
 (A4)
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Under decentralization, the DD decides the market price pi to maximize 
(A3). The HQ choose the internal transfer price Ti to maximize (A4). As a 
result, when firm i deviates to decentralization, its DD chooses the deviation 
market price pi
dev as follows:
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Proof of Proposition 1 
First, this proof shows Proposition 1. When �� � �� holds and each firm chooses the 
centralization strategy, each firm also selects the level of transfer price �� such that �� � ��. In 
addition, each firm chooses the market price as follows: 
�� � �� �
� � �
2 � � .                                                                                                                ����
The firms’ total profit is as follows:  
Π� � Π� �
������ � �� � ������ � ��� � �� � �������
�2 � ���   . ��2�
Firm �’s incentive to deviate from this realized profit is considered in the following analysis. 
Given the competitor’s strategy (A1), the decision makers in firm � face the following 
object function:  
���� � ����� � ��� �� � �� � �
� � �
2 � ���                               ����
Π� � � ������ � ��� � ����� � ��� �� � �� � �
� � �
2 � ��
��
�
������ .            ����
Under decentralization, the DD decides the market price �� to maximize (A3). The HQ 
choose the internal transfer price �� to maximize (A4). As a result, when firm � deviates to 
decentralization, its DD chooses the deviation market price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2� � �� � �2 � ����
2�2 � ��  .                                     ����
In addition, HQ choose the deviation internal transfer price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2����� � �� � ���2�� � ���
�2 � ���2�� � ���
  . ����
Using (A5) and (A6), the deviation profitΠ���� is obtained as follows: 
Π���� �
������ � �� � ������ � ���2�� � ������ � �� � ���������
�2 � ����2�� � ���
 .         ����
The difference between (A2) and (A7) is obtained (it subtracts Π�from Π����). 
 (A5)
In addition, HQ choose the deviation internal transfer price Ti
dev as 
follows:
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Proof of Proposition 1 
First, this proof shows Proposition 1. When �� � �� holds and each firm chooses the 
centralization strategy, each firm also selects the level of transfer price �� such that �� � ��. In 
addition, each firm chooses the market price as follows: 
�� � �� �
� � �
2 � � .                                                                                                                ����
The firms’ total profit is as follows:  
Π� � Π� �
������ � �� � ������ � ��� � �� � �������
�2 � ���   . ��2�
Firm �’s incentive to deviate from this realized profit is considered in the following analysis. 
Given the competitor’s strategy (A1), the decision makers in firm � face the following 
object function:  
���� � ���� � ��� �� � �� � �
� � �
2 � ���                               ����
Π� � � ������ � ��� � ����� � ��� �� � �� � �
� � �
2 � ��
��
�
������ .            ����
Under decentralization, the DD decides the market price � to maximize (A3). The HQ 
choose the internal transfer price �� to maximize (A4). As a result, when firm � deviates to 
decentralization, its DD chooses the deviation market price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2� � �� � �2 � ����
2�2 � ��  .                                     ����
In addition, HQ choose the deviation internal transfer price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2����� � �� � ���2�� � ���
�2 � ���2�� � ���
  . � ��
Using (A5) and (A6), the deviation profitΠ���� is obtained as follows: 
Π���� �
������ � �� � ������ � ���2�� � ������ � �� � ���������
�2 � ����2�� � ���
 .         ����
The difference between (A2) and (A7) is obtained (it subtracts Π�from Π����). 
 (A6)
Using (A5) and (A6), the deviation profit Пi
dev is obtained as follows:
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Proof of Proposition 1 
First, this proof shows Proposition 1. When �� � �� holds and each firm chooses the 
centralization strategy, each firm also selects the level of transfer price �� such that �� ��. In 
addition, each firm chooses the market price as follows: 
�� � �� �
� �
2 � � .                                                                                                                ����
The firms’ total profit is as follows:  
Π� � Π� �
������ � �� � ������ ��� � �� � �������
�2 � ���   . ��2�
Firm �’s incentive to deviate from this realized profit s consid red in the following ana ysis. 
Given the competitor’s strategy (A1), the decision makers in firm � face the following 
object function:  
�� � � ����� � ��� �� � �� � �
�
2 � ���                               ����
Π� � � ������ � ��� � ����� ��� �� � �� � �
� �
2 � ��
��
�
������ .            ����
Under decentralization, the DD decides the market price �� to maximize (A3). The HQ 
choose the internal transfer price �� to maximize (A4). As a result, when firm � deviates to 
decentralization, its DD chooses the deviation market price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2� � �� � �2 ����
2�2 ��  .                                     ����
In addition, HQ choose the deviation internal transfer price ����� as follows: 
����� �
2����� �� ���2�� ���
2 � �2�� ���
  . ����
Using (A5) and (A6), the deviation profitΠ���  is obtained as follows: 
Π���� �
������ � �� � ������ ���2�� � �� ��� � �� � ���������
�2 � ����2�� � ���
 .         ����
The difference between (A2) and (A7) is obtained (it subtracts Π�from Π����).  (A7)
The difference between (A2) and (A7) is obtained (it subtracts Пi 
from Пi
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Π���� � Π� �
��� � ��������� � �1 � ������ � ������� � �����1 � ���������
�� � ������� � ���
� �.                                                                                                                    ����
This result shows that when �� � �� holds, firm � has no incentive to deviate to 
decentralization. Hence, each firm chooses the centralization strategy in equilibrium. next, it 
is considered the condition of unique equilibrium, namely that the decentralization strategy is 
chosen in equilibrium. In this research setting, asymmetric equilibrium will not exist. Hence, 
this study considers the symmetric equilibrium. The threshold for the firm not choosing the 
decentralization equilibrium is obtained as follows: 
��� �
1
4��� � �����4 � ����� � ��1 � �����
� ��� � ��
��� ����
� ����4���� � ������ � �� � �������
� ��� � �� � ����� � �� � �����������
� ��� � 1�� � ������ � ��� � �� � ��������
� �� � ����������.                                                                                        ����
When (A9) holds, the centralization equilibrium becomes a unique equilibrium. □
Proof of Proposition 2 
This proof shows the existence of the condition where the profit of the centralized 
equilibrium with information linkage is smaller than that of the decentralized equilibrium 
without information linkage. It is denoted profit for firm � with and without the information 
linkage system as Π��� and Π����, respectively. It is subtracted Π��� from Π���� as follows: 
Π���� � Π��� �
�
���� � �1 � ������ � �1 � ��������� ��� � ��1� � ������ � 4�1 � ������
��4 � ����� � ��1 � �����
� � ��
��
�
��� � ���
�� � ���  .                                               ��1��
When (A10) is negative, total profit without the information linkage system is larger than 
total profit with the system in equilibrium. The condition for a negative (A10) can be 
obtained as follows: 
��� �
���� � �1 � ������ � �1 � ��������� ��� � ��1� � ������ � 4�1 � ������
��4 � ����� � ��1 � �����
�
� ���.                                                                                                               ��11�
When (A11) and (19) hold simultaneously, proposition is proven. It is considered the 
outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) as Σ, but it is difficult to judge whether it is negative 
or positive. Hence, when Σ is positive, the outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) is positive. 
In that case, (A11) and (19) hold concurrently. Σ is calculated as follows: 
Σ � ��� � 1�� � ������� � ��1� � 14� � �������� � ��� � ������ � � .      ��1��
 (A8)
This r sult sh ws that wh n τh > τd holds, firm i has no i centive to 
deviate to decentralization. Hence, each firm chooses the centralization 
strategy in equilibrium. next, it is considered the condition of unique 
equilibrium, namely that the decentralization strategy is chosen in 
equilibrium. In this research setting, asymmetric equilibrium will not exist. 
Hence, this study considers the symmetric equilibrium. The threshold for the 
firm not choosing the decentralization equilibrium is obtained as follows:
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This result shows that when �� � �� holds, firm � has no incentive to deviate to 
decentralization. Hence, each firm chooses the centralization strategy in equilibrium. next, it 
is considered the condition of unique equilibrium, namely that the decentralization strategy is 
chosen in equilibrium. In this research setting, asymmetric equilibrium will not exist. Hence, 
this study considers the symmetric equilibrium. The threshold for the firm not choosing the 
decentralization equilibrium is obtained as follows: 
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� ��� � ��
��� ����
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� ��� � 1�� � ������ � ��� � �� � ��������
� �� � ����������.                                                                                        ����
When (A9) holds, the centralization equilibrium becomes a unique equilibrium. □
Proof of Proposition 2 
This proof shows the existence of the condition where the profit of the centralized 
equilibrium with information linkage is smaller than that of the decentralized equilibrium 
without information linkage. It is denoted profit for firm � with and without the information 
linkage system as Π��� and Π����, respectively. It is subtracted Π��� from Π���� as follows: 
Π���� � Π��� �
�
���� � �1 � ������ � �1 � ��������� ��� � ��1� � ������ � 4�1 � ������
��4 � ����� � ��1 � �����
� � ��
��
�
��� � ���
�� � ���  .                                               ��1��
When (A10) is negative, total profit without the information linkage system is larger than 
total profit with the system in equilibrium. The condition for a negative (A10) can be 
obtained as follows: 
��� �
���� � �1 � ������ � �1 � ��������� ��� � ��1� � ������ � 4�1 � ������
��4 � ����� � ��1 � �����
�
� ���.                                                                                                               ��11�
When (A11) and (19) hold simultaneously, proposition is proven. It is considered the 
outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) as Σ, but it is difficult to judge whether it is negative 
or positive. Hence, when Σ is positive, the outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) is positive. 
In that case, (A11) and (19) hold concurrently. Σ is calculated as follows: 
Σ � ��� � 1�� � ������� � ��1� � 14� � �������� � ��� � ������ � � .      ��1��
 (A9)
When (A9) holds, the centralization equilibrium becomes a unique 
equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2
This proof shows the existence of the condition where the pr fit of the 
centralized equilibr um with information linkage is smaller than that of the 
decentralized quilibrium without information linkage. It is denoted profit 
for firm i with and without the information linkage system as Пi
IL and Пi
NIL, 
respectively. It is subtracted Пi
IL from Пi
NIL as follows:
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This result shows that when �� � �� holds, firm � has no incentive to deviate to 
decentralization. Hence, each firm chooses the centralization strategy in equilibrium. next, it 
is considered the condition of unique equilibrium, namely that the decentralization strategy is 
chosen in equilibrium. In this research setting, asymmetric equilibrium will not exist. Hence, 
this study considers the symmetric equilibrium. The threshold for the firm not choosing the 
decentralization equilibrium is obtained as follows: 
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� �� � ����������.                                                                                        ����
When (A9) holds, the centralization equilibrium becomes a unique equilibrium. □
Proof of Proposition 2 
This proof show  the existence of the condition where he profit of the centralized 
equilibrium with information linkag  is smaller than that of the decentralized equilibrium 
without information linkage. It is denoted profit for firm � with and without the information 
linkage system as Π��� and Π����, respectively. It is subtracted Π��� from Π���� as follows: 
Π���� � Π��� �
�
���� � �1 � ������ � �1 � ��������� ��� � ��1� ������ � 4�1 ������
��4 ����� � ��1 � �����
� � ��
��
�
��� � ���
�� � ���  .                                               ��1��
When (A10) is negative, total profit without the information linkage system is larger than 
total profit with the system in equilibrium. The condition for a negative (A10) can be 
obtained as follows: 
��� �
���� � �1 � ������ � �1 � �������� ��� � ��1� � ������ � 4�1 � �� ���
��4 � ����� ��1 � � �
�
� ���.                                                                                                               ��11�
When (A11) and (19) hold simultaneously, proposition is proven. It is considered the 
outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) as Σ, but it is difficult to judge whether it is negative 
or positive. Hence, when Σ is positive, the outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) is positive. 
In that case, (A11) and (19) hold concurrently. Σ is calculated as follows: 
Σ � ��� � 1�� � ������� � ��1� � 14� � �������� � ��� � ������ � � .      ��1��
 (A10)
When (A10) is negative, total profit without the information linkage 
system is larger than total profit with the system in equilibrium. The 
condition for a negative (A10) can be obtained as follows:
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Thi  result shows that when � � �� holds, firm � has no incentive to deviate to 
decentralization. Henc , each fi m chooses the centralizati n strategy in equilibrium. next, it 
is o sidered th  condit on of uniqu  equilibrium, namely that the decentralization strategy is 
chosen in equilibrium. In this research setting, asymmetric equilibrium will not exist. Hence, 
this study considers the symmetric equilibrium. The threshold for the firm not choosing the 
decentralization equilibrium is obtained as follows: 
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When (A9) olds, the centralization equilibrium b comes a unique quilibrium. □
Proof of Proposition 2 
This proof shows the existence of the condition where the profit of the centralized 
equilibrium with information linkage is smaller than that of the decentralized equilibrium 
without information linkage. It is denoted profit for firm � with and without the information 
linkage system as Π��  and Π��� , respectively. It is subtracted Π��� from Π���� as follows: 
Π���� � Π��� �
�
���� � �1 � ����� � �1 � ��������� ��� � ��1� � ��� � 4�1 � ������
��4 � ����� � ��1 � �����
� � ��
��
�
��� � ���
�� � ���  .                                               ��1��
When (A10) is ne ative, total profit without e informa ion l kage system is larger than 
total profit with the system in equilibrium. The condition for a negative (A10) can be 
obtained as follows: 
��� �
���� � �1 � ������ � �1 � ��������� ��� � ��1� � ������ � 4�1 � ������
��4 � ����� � ��1 � �����
�
� ���.                                                                                                               ��11�
When (A11) and (19) hold simultaneously, proposition is proven. It is considered the 
outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) as Σ, but it is difficult to judge whether it is negative 
or positive. Hence, when Σ is positive, the outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) is positive. 
In that case, (A11) and (19) hold concurrently. Σ is calculated as follows: 
Σ � ��� � 1�� � ������� � ��1� � 14� � �������� � ��� � ������ � � .      ��1��
 (A11)
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When (A11) and (19) hold simultaneously, proposition is proven. It is 
considered the outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) as Σ, but it is difficult 
to judge whether it is negative or positive. Hence, when Σ is positive, the 
outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) is positive. In that case, (A11) and 
(19) hold concurrently. Σ is calculated as follows:
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This result shows that when �� � �� holds, firm � has no incentive to deviate to 
decentralization. Hence, each firm chooses the centralization strategy in equilibrium. next, it 
is considered the condition of unique equilibrium, namely that the decentralization strategy is 
chosen in equilibrium. In this research setting, asymmetric equilibrium will not exist. Hence, 
this study considers the symmetric equilibrium. The threshold for the firm not choosing the 
decentralization equilibrium is obtained as follows: 
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When (A9) holds, the centralization equilibrium becomes a unique equilibrium. □
Proof of Proposition 2 
This proof shows the existence of the condition where the profit of the centralized 
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When (A10) is negative, total profit without the information linkage system is larger than 
total profit with the system in equilibrium. The condition for a negative (A10) can be 
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When (A11) and (19) hold simultaneously, proposition is proven. It is considered the 
outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) as Σ, but it is difficult to judge whether it is negative 
or positive. Hence, when Σ is positive, the outcome of subtracting (19) from (A11) is positive. 
In that case, (A11) and (19) hold concurrently. Σ is calculated as follows: 
Σ � ��� � 1�� � ������� � ��1� � 14� � �������� � ��� � ������ � � .      ��1��
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It is considered the condition when (A13) is negative. From (A13), when  
�� �
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holds, the minimum value of Σ is  
    Σ �
�� � ���� � ���� � ���� � ����
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It is considered that �� � �� holds; hence, the coefficient of �� in (A14) must be less than 1. 
This is true when 
3 � √3
3 � � � ��                                                                                                                �����
holds. In addition, when (A15) is negative, Σ is negative under specific conditions. The 
denominator of (A15) is positive; therefore, it is demonstrated the sign of �� � ���� �
���� � ���� � ���� with � � � � �. It is denoted �� � ���� � ���� � ���� � ���� �
�. Because it is difficult to identify the sign of �, it is considered the sign of � with � � �
and � � �. When � � � holds, the sign of � is positive. When � � � holds, the sign of � is 
negative. Hence, � must be 0 when � � � � �. Therefore, (A16) and � � � hold 
simultaneously. note that � � � is a more robust condition than  (A16). Thus,  
�� � ���� � ���� � ���� � ���� � ��                                                                   �����
and � � � � � hold simultaneously, and Σ is negative. In this situation, (19) and (A11) hold 
concurrently. In addition, it is illustrated � when � � � � � (Figure A.1).  
Figure A.1: Plotting � when � � � � �
As a result, it is found that, in equilibrium, the firm’s total profit without the information 
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As a result, it is found that, in equilibrium, the firm’s total profit without the information 
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It is considered that τh > τd holds; hence, the coefficient of τd in (A14) 
must be less than 1. This is true when
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As a result, it is found that, in equilibrium, the firm’s total profit without the information 
 holds. I  addition, when (A15) is negative, Σ is negative under 
specific co di ions. The denominator of (A15) is positive; th refore, 
it is demonstrated the sign of 54 – 146θ + 77θ2 + 16θ3 –10θ4 with 0 < 
θ ≤ 1. It is denoted 54 – 146θ + 77θ2 + 16θ3 –10θ4 = α. Because it is 
diffic lt to identify he sign of , it is considered th  sign of α with θ = 
152
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0 and θ = 1. When θ = 0 holds, the sign of α is positive. When θ = 1 
holds, the sign of α is negative. Hence, α must be 0 when 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. 
Therefore, (A16) and α ≤ 0 hold simultaneously. note that α ≤ 0 is a 
more robust condition than  (A16). Thus, 
54 – 146θ + 77θ2 + 16θ3 –10θ4 < 0,
 and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 hold simultaneously, and Σ is negative. In this situation, 
(19) and (A11) hold concurrently. In addition, it is illustrated α when 
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (Figure A.1). 
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As a result, it is found that, in equilibrium, the firm’s total profit without the information 
Figure A.1: Plotting 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 when 
  r lt, it is foun  that, in equilibriu , the firm’s total profit without 
the information linkage system is larger than that with the information 
linkage system. 
Proof of Proposition 3 and 4
It was differentiated Eq. (A11) with respect to τh or τd, and obtained 
Proposition 3 and 4. 
